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In recent years, thinking about the American Presidential primaries has been dominated by 
the image of Carter's victory in 1976. Conventional wisdom in the eighties has advised Presidential 
candidates to focus on the early contests in Iowa and New Hampshire, and to at least match, or better 
yet, exceed the expectations that the press, pollsters, and pundits have for them in those states. The 
successful campaign, it was thought, had to force the competition out by the end of March in order to 
lock up the nomination before the convention.1 This common wisdom - the so-called "momentum 
theory" - will now have to be revised as a result of what happened in the 1988 primaries. While 
one candidate from each patty did eventually emerge victorious in 1988, no one followed the Carter 
script as closely as expected. The Democratic race was not clearly resolved until Dukakis managed 
consecutive victories over Jackson in Wisconsin (April 5), New York (April 19) and Pennsylvania 
(April 26). On the Republican side, even though the race was over after SuperTuesday, the 
conventional "momentum" story was still marred by the odd-and in the end, meaningless-­
outcome in Iowa Republican caucuses. Bush exceeded expectations in Iowa, but in a negative 
direction, and both Dole and Robertson were unable to convert their successes into any advantage in 
New Hampshire and the South. 
In this paper, we use data from a series of 12 exit polls conducted by the Los Angeles Times 
to explain the course of the 1988 Democratic and Republican presidential primary campaigns. The 
Los Angeles Times sample of primaries includes the critical early Democratic and Republican 
contests in Iowa and New Hampshire, six SuperTuesday states, and the Democratic primaries in 
Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania and California. The story we tell is quite simple. Momentum in 
both races was slowed by regionalism, and in the Democratic contest specifically, by the 
1. See, for instance, Larry Bartels, Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1988: John Aldrich, Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nomination 
Campaigns; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980; Gru:y R. Otren and :t-Telson \V. Polsby, (eds.) A1edia ar.d 
Momentum; New Jersey: Chatham House, 1987. 
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non-strategic support that blacks and affluent liberal whites gave Jesse Jackson. Momentum 
accelerated in the New York and Pennsylvania primaries as moderate and Jewish voters strategically 
switched to Dukakis in order to block Jesse Jackson's nomination. Both Bush and Dukakis staked 
out positions for themselves near the center of the ideological spectrum in their respective parties. 
As it turned out, the distribution of voter preferences, combined with strategic complications typical 
of multicandidate races, served to make the middle an advantageous spot for the victorious 
candidates. 
IDEOLOGY IN THE 1988 PRIMARIES 
Primary voters in American primary elections tend to be more partisan and ideological than 
general election voters.2 Moreover, since primaries pit candidates from the same party against one 
another, partisan appeals are necessarily ineffective, forcing candidates to try to distinguish 
themselves on some other basis, such as ideology or policy. However, this too is frequently difficult. 
The range of policy differences among candidates in a primary field is often quite narrow while the 
number of candidates - at least, in the early stages when the candidates first stake out their 
ideological positions - can be large. 
Nonetheless, in 1988, the candidates of both parties managed to establish discernible 
ideological identities. On the Democratic side, Jesse Jackson and Paul Simon took 
uncompromisingly liberal positions on most issues. Bruce Babbitt and Michael Dukakis, by 
comparison moderated their liberalism with concessions to fiscal austerity. Richard Gephardt and 
Albert Gore advocated a harder line on defense issues and seemed to claim a more conservative 
position although it is difficult to characterize Gephardt's stance on trade policy as either liberal or 
conservative. On the Republican side, Jack Kemp and Pat Robertson stood on the far right, steadfast 
in their support of the conservative agenda on social, economic and foreign policy issues. George 
Bush wrapped himself up in the mantle of Ronald Reagan, but seemed more moderate due, perhaps, 
to the memory of his 1980 campaign, or to the fact that the Reagan administration itself seemed 
moderate in comparison with Kemp and Robertson. Robert Dole, in contrast, had distanced himself 
from Reagan during the Iran-Contra scandal and declined to sign a pledge not to raise taxes. 
Though the policy differences between Dole and Bush were very minor, Dole's independence 
appealed to those in the moderate wing of the party (and independents and Democrats as well). The 
differences between the candidates of different parties were, of course, greater than those within each 
party: no Democratic candidate, for instance, could be considered to the right of any Republican. 
Even so, there were still significant differences along a liberal--conservative dimension between the 
various candidates within both parties, differences which structured the policy debates in the 1988 
primaries. 
2. Nelson Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections; 6th Edition New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1984,
Chapter3. 
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The distribution of voters within each party on a liberal-conseivative dimension was as 
different as that of the candidates. In none of the Democratic primaries, including the south, did 
more than 8 percent of the voters describe themselves as "very conservative," while in the 
Republican primaries between 15 and 24 percent of the voters placed themselves in the far right 
category. Likewise, between 2 and 4 percent of the Republicans described themselves as "very 
liberal" compared to at least 10 percent in each of the Democratic primaries. The median respondent 
in each of the Republican primaries was "somewhat conseivative." In the Democratic primaries, the 
median respondent was either "moderate" or "somewhat liberal." It is safe to locate the median voter 
in the Democratic primaries a bit to the left of center and the median voter in Republican primaries 
as quite a bit to the right of center, though probably not far right. In the electorate as a whole the 
median voter lies near the center of the ideological spectrum. 
[ Insert Table 1 here ] 
Another noteworthy feature of Table 1 is that the ideological distribution within the parties 
seems to vary by state. On the Democratic side, the South especially, and Illinois to a lesser extent, 
had fewer liberal voters. Only one third of the Southern Democrats identified themselves or liberal 
or very liberal, for instance, as opposed to 49% of New Hampshire Democrats and 48% of New York 
Democrats. In no state, however, did a majority of Democrats identify themselves as liberals. Our 
sample of Republican states is smaller, but there were some significant differences - Illinois 
Republicans were considerably less conservative than Republicans in Iowa. Interestingly, Southern 
Republican voters in 1988 were not distinctively more conservative than those in Iowa and New 
Hampshire as were their Democratic counterparts. In general, the ideological configuration was 
more complex for Democratic than Republican candidates. While Democratic candidates in 1988 
had to adapt to very different distributions of opinion as they progressed through the sequence of 
primaries, Republican candidates did not need to contend with as much ideological heterogeneity. 
Voting in the 1988 primaries consistently followed ideological lines. The evidence relating 
ideological self-placement to primary voting is presented in Tables 2a and 2b. In every state except 
ffiinois Dukakis won a plurality of ti'le 11somewhat liberal11 vote. Gephardt and Gore each did better 
among "moderate" and "somewhat conservative" voters (by as much as twenty points) than among 
liberal voters. Jackson and Simon support was generally strongest among "very liberal" voters. On 
the Republican side, Kemp and Robertson support grew with the conservatism of the voter: it was 
negligible among liberal voters, stronger among moderates, stronger still among moderate 
conservatives, and often a plurality among very conservative voters. For Dole the pattern was 
reversed. Dole, despite his conservative voting record in the Senate and his loyal service as majority 
leader, could muster only modest support among conservatives. He fared well among moderates, but 
it turned out there weren't enough moderates in the Republican primaries to defeat Bush who, in 
every state but Iowa, swept the "somewhat conservative" category. 
[ Insert Tables 2a and 2b here ] 
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In two-candidate races, the median is the most advantageous location for a candidate.3 If 
voters decide solely on the basis of ideology, the median defeats any other position. However, the 
situation is much more complicated in multi-candidate elections since a candidate adopting the 
position of the median voter can be "squeezed" out by candidates on either side.4 Indeed, this was a 
real possibility in the 1988 presidential primaries. On the Democratic side, if either Jackson or 
Simon could have consistently captured the far left vote and either Gephardt or Gore could have 
consistently captured the moderate vote, Dukakis would have been left with only a share of the 
"somewhat liberal" vote and probably would have come up short. As it happened, Gephardt and 
Gore split the moderate Democratic vote, and both had dropped out by the time Jackson had 
overtaken Simon as the candidate of the left. Instead of being squeezed out, Dukakis was left 
peacefully in the middle as other candidates-two on both sides of him-fought over fairly narrow 
shares of vote in each wing. The Republican race was not altogether different. Robertson and Kemp 
split the very conservative vote, leaving Bush with no strong challenge from his right. Dole did not 
face any competition on the left, but he was unable to win the moderate vote decisively enough to 
overcome Bush's support from the right. 
Even though the median can be a dangerous spot in a multicandidate election, what we 
show in subsequent sections is that a variety of other factors-region, race, religion-worked to the 
advantage of the median candidates in 1988 by weakening their opponents to the right and left. It 
should be said, however, that there were a few notable exceptions to the patterns described above. 
First, Dukakis and Simon in lliinois received a higher percentage of votes from moderates and 
moderate conservatives than from liberals. The apparent reason for this reversal of the expected 
relationship is that Jackson's presence as a viable candidate on the left forced moderate and 
conservative Democrats to coalesce around any candidate to the right of Jackson, no matter how 
objectionable. Second, in a number of states (Iowa, the south, lliinois) Bush's overall strength was 
unrelated to ideological identification. Of course, Bush's support relative to Dole did vary by the 
voter's position so it cannot be said that ideology was unimportant in the Republican race. 
In summary, although the unlying ideological orientation of the two parties differed 
measurably, both the Democratic and Republican contests featured candidates on the left, middle 
and right of their respective constituencies. The "middle" for Democrats was considerably to the left 
of that for Republicans, but in both parties there was a considerable middle and it was from here that 
the victorious candidates emerged. There was nothing inevitable, however, about the primaries 
producing candidates near each party's median, as in both parties there were strong candidates on 
either flank. We must tum to a variety of nonideological factors to explain the eventual success of 
the centrist candidates. 




Presidential primaries are a part of a complex coalition building process. Coalitions are 
usually described in terms of the demographic characteristics of voters and it is to an analysis of such 
factors that we now tum. In the appendix, we present a series of equations explaining voting in each 
state's primary. The choice probabilities are of the multinomial logit form with the implicit 
dependent variable in each equation being the log odds of choosing the specified candidate over 
either Bush or Dukakis. Candidates who did not mount serious campaigns in a particular state's 
primary were eliminated from the model so the set of candidates varies from state to state. The 
choice probabilities are a function of ideology (liberal, moderate or conservative), occupational 
status (white collar or blue collar), education (those with some college attendance distinguished from 
those without), gender, religion (Catholic or non-Catholic or, in some states, Jewish), union 
membership, and race (white, black, Hispanic, or Asian). 
In the Democratic primaries, one notices a variety of cleavages in the primary electorate. 
We discuss support for Jackson in more detail below, but, in broad outline, Jackson supporters can 
be divided into two groups: blacks (and other nonwhites) and very liberal, well-educated whites. 
Both groups have been loyal Democratic supporters in recent presidential elections. Gore and 
Gephardt, on the other hand, drew support from more marginal Democratic voters: conservative and 
southern blue--<:ollar workers without college educations. It was, of course, Jimmy Carter's success 
in attracting the support of such voters in 1976 that gave the Democrats their only victory in a 
presidential election over the past quarter century. Michael Dukakis did score well however, among 
Catholics and union members. The support for Dukakis among Catholics is particularly strong. In 
most states, being Catholic increases the probability of voting for Dukakis over Jackson by between 
15 and 20 percent and over Gore by between 8 and 15 percent. Dukakis did well among college­
educated voters (though relatively less well than either Jackson or Simon) without repelling the less 
well educated (who were usually only 5 to 10 percent more likely to support Gore or Gephardt). 
Also, Dukakis ran consistently better among women. 
Ltl. the Repub!ica.11 primaries, the electorate is more homogeneous and the demographic 
cleavages much less apparent. On Super Tuesday, Dole drew greater support among white--<:ollar 
college educated voters than Bush, but the opposite was the case in Iowa. There was a small but 
persistent pro-Dole bias in the female in the Republican primaries Bush did relatively well among 
the small number of union members voting in the Republican primaries, but there was little 
indication in the primary data of how Bush would fare among the blue--<:ollar whites in November. 
ISSUES AND CANDIDATE SUPPORT 
The LA Times also asked a series of questions on specific issues that allow us to identify 
more precisely the policy matters of importance in the 1988 primaries. These items cover a broad 
range of issues-economic, social and foreign policy. Each item is in the form of a statement to 
which respondents can indicate their agreement. Failure to agree can indicate either no opinion or 
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disagreement so these items must be interpreted with caution. In table 3 we have presented the 
percentage of each candidate's voters who agree with each statement. Table 3 also included the 
percentage of Republicans, white white-collar (ww) and white blue-collar (wb) democrats, Hispanic 
democrats, and black democrats agreeing with each statement. The white blue-collar democrats are 
a particularly important swing group in American Presidential elections, providing considerable 
support for Reagan in both 1980 and 1984. 
[ Insert Table 3 here ] 
Economic policy debates centered on the budget. Should taxes be raised? Should there be 
more domestic spending? Should defense spending be cut? There was very little support for a tax 
increase among either Democrats or Republicans in 1988. The only group exhibiting any support for 
a tax increase was the white white-collar Democrat and even then it was far from a majority (27 
percent of them). On spending matters, there was a greater divergence of opinion between the 
parties. Half of the upper-class white Democrats favored more domestic spending compared to less 
than a quarter of the Republicans. The blue-collar white Democrats on this issue, as on many 
others, fell somewhere between these two groups. The typical Jackson and Simon votes were more 
likely to favor and the Gephardt and Gore voters were less likely to favor additional domestic 
spending. On the Republican side, Dole voters were a bit more likely than other voters to support 
additional domestic spending, but overall Republican support was very low. In general, domestic 
spending was an issue that divided the Democratic and Republican parties from each other much 
more than it divided the members of each party. In contrast, defense cuts were a divisive issue for 
the Democrats. Between only 17 and 26 percent of the Republicans favored any reduction of 
defense spending (with Dole voters slightly more likely to be supportive than the others) but among 
Democrats, there was a schism between white collar and blue collar whites with the former favoring 
and the latter opposing defense cuts. Gore and Gephardt voters were more conservative on defense 
issues, which made them tempting targets for the Republicans in the November campaign. 
Republican attitudes on defense spending were manifestations of a general conservatism on 
foreign policy. Between 32 a.nd 42 percent ofRepub!ica..11 primary voters supported aid for the 
Nicaraguan Contras compared to fewer than 16 percent support among any of the Democratic 
groups. Among Democratic voters, supporters of Gore and Gephardt were more likely to favor 
Contra aid. Among Republican voters, there was uniform support in 1988 for Contra aid except 
among Dole supporters, who exhibited their usual moderation. Partisan differences over the INF 
treaty were less distinct. Upper class white Democrats were more supportive of the INF treaty than 
Republicans while Black, Hispanic and blue- collar white Democrats were less supportive. These 
differences may have only reflected lower levels of familiarity with the treaty and, in any event, the 
issue did not appear to be a significant factor in explaining voting in the Democratic primaries. The 
INF treaty did, however, appear to have some influence on voting in the Republican primaries :e.g., 
Robertson voters were significantly less likely to support it than those who voted for the other 
Republican candidates. 
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Debate over social issues was less contentious in 1 988 than in prior years, but traditional 
divisions over issues like abortion and AIDS testing confonned to what in recent years have been 
customary patterns. Republicans were much more likely to support a ban on abortions and 
mandatory AIDS testing than Democrats although, as usual, blue-<:ollar white Democrats fell 
somewhere in the middle on this issue. Social issues provide us with somewhat more purchase on 
vote choice in the Republican primaries. Robertson supporters were the least likely to take a 
pra-<:hoice position on abortion and the most willing to institute mandatory AIDS testing of all 
Republican voters. Bush and Dole supporters did not differ much on social issues while Kemp 
supporters fell inbetween. Much of Robertson's success, such as it was, can be attributed to his 
ability to capitalize on various social concerns of the religious right. This deprived Kemp of much 
of his natural constituency, leaving Bush with a candidate much weaker in other respects to his right. 
REGIONALISM AND THE SLOWING OF MOMENTUM 
Both Dukakis and Bush succeeded in 1988 in spite of defeat in the Iowa primary. Their 
opponents were unable to carry "momentum" into the New Hampshire primaries. Why was this so? 
No doubt the size of the field, the blandness of the candidates, strategic mistakes and the like all 
played a role in 1 988, but one critical factor was regionalism. We mean by this that various 
candidates in both parties ran to some degree on regional themes and were rewarded with higher 
levels of electoral support across the board in primaries on their "home turf." Regionalism mattered 
in two ways. It mattered first because it affected the results in the "home" primaries. Gephardt, 
coming from Missouri, won the Iowa caucuses with 31 percent and later his home state with 58 
percent of the vote. Simon, from lllinois, finished second in nearby Iowa (with 27 percent) and also 
won his home state. Dukakis won neighboring New Hampshire (36 percent of the vote) and every 
other state in New England, except the low turnout Democratic caucus in Vennont. And, of course, 
Gore who ran as the southern candidate on Super Tuesday, carried Tennessee, Kentucky, North 
Carolina, Arkansas and Oklahoma, but exhibited little strength elsewhere. Even on the Republican 
side, Dole's strongest showing came in the Midwest caucus states (Minnesota, Kansas and Iowa). 
Regionalism may have also mattered in a second sense--namely that "home" victories did 
not have much impact on other states. The successes of Dole, Gephardt and Simon in Iowa did not 
carry over into New Hampshire. Gore was unable to tum a strong (and better than expected) 
showing in the South into any victories after March 8. Even in the case of Dukakis, it was not New 
Hampshire, but rather Florida, Texas and New York that seemed to be more crucial to his eventual 
success. Candidates are nonnally expected to do better on their home turf, so it is not surprising that 
the victories of Dole and Gephardt in Iowa, Dukakis in New Hampshire, and Gore on Super Tuesday 
did not generate much momentum. But, by dampening the informational value and muddling the 
significance of a victory, regionalism slowed the winnowing process and delayed the emergence of a 
single nominee. 
What evidence is there of regionalism? We present two kinds. The first comes from a 
question that the LA Times repeated in every primary asking voters to identify the reasons for why 
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they supported the candidate that they did (see Table 4). In the Iowa Republican caucus, voters who 
mentioned the experience of their candidate were more or less evenly divided between Bush and 
Dole (46 percent for Dole, 42 percent for Bush). Those who referred to leadershlp or to the prospect 
of the candidate getting the job done preferred Dole to Bush by about a two-to-one margin. But 
among the 15 percent who mentioned that the candidate was "from the midwest and understands our 
problems," Dole had the edge on Bush 95 percent to 3 percent Of course, since Bush had no 
significant link by either birth or residency to the mid west, one wouldn't expect Bush voters to cite 
regional connections. Nonetheless, 38 percent of Dole voters did cite thls as a reason for their vote. 
Additionally, 18 percent of the voters spoke of their preferred candidate's ability to "care about 
people like me," and they preferred Dole to Bush by almost a five to one margin. 
[ Insert Table 4 here ] 
A similar story can be told about the Democratic primary in Iowa. Gephardt, who wolked 
very hard to identify hlmself with regional issues and concerns, was the leading candidate in only 
two categories: empathy ("seems to care about people like us") and being from the midwest. By 
comparison, Dukakis was the first choice of those who mentioned leadershlp and efficiency, and 
Simon was first among those who valued trust and experience (although he was second to Gephardt 
among those who gave being from midwest as a reason). Altogether, as Table 4 shows, region was 
mentioned by 46 percent of Gephardt's supporters in Iowa, 22 percent of Simon's and 38 percent of 
Dole's. On the Republican side, regional factors were probably not major determinants for Bush in 
the New Hampshire and Super Tuesday Republican primaries (even though Bush claimed a 
residence in both Maine and Texas), suggesting, perhaps, that in politics, unlike the real estate 
business, two homes are not better than one. On the Democratic side, regional factors continued to 
affect the outcome even after Iowa. Thlrty percent of Dukakis's supporters mentioned that he was 
from New England and understood their problems. Dukakis was also preferred by the 27 percent 
who claimed that they voted the way that they did because the candidate "seems to care about people 
like me." 
Given the intent of Super Tuesday, it is not surprising to fi..1 d t..11.at regionalism was also 
mentioned by 8 percent of Democratic voters and 18 percent of those who voted for Gore on March 
8, and that Gore was second only to Jackson among the 21 percent who mentioned empathy with the 
region as a reason for voting they way that they did. Corroborating our new found law about 
multiple homes, Jackson got relatively small advantages in the south and Illinois for hls regional 
connections to those areas. Illinois was the last significant primary in whlch regionalism was evident 
according to thls measure, benefitting Simon and, belatedly, Dole. 
A second, more sophlsticated test of the same phenomenon comes from the equation in 
Table A2 in the appendix. Here we have combined the data from all of the exit polls in order to 
obtain an estimate of the effects of regional affiliation on primary voting. Being from the same 
region as a candidate is estimated to increase one's probability of voting for that candidate by 
between 9 and 13 percent (depending upon one's inclination to support the candidate for other 
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reasons). The effect is statistically significant (p < 0.01) and does not reflect the influence of other 
factors, such as race, class or ideology, that are controlled for in the equation. 
If the data suggest that regionalism was a sometimes decisive factor in 1 988, the question is, 
"Why?" The first explanation is that Reagan's economic policies had different effects on different 
sectors of the economy and regions of the country and this was reflected in political behavior. 
Elsewhere, one of us has argued that Reagan's highly popular presidency was due less to his teflon 
personality than to robust economic conditions. 5 However, not all parts of the economy have 
prospered during this period. Farmers in the midwest, residents in oil producing regions such as the 
southwest, and workers in rustbelt industries threatened by foreign competition have not shared fully 
in the recovery of the past five years, and this caused discontent in some areas that Reagan carried in 
the last election. 
One possibility, therefore, is that varying sectoral economic conditions fueled regionalism in 
1 988. Midwestern voters were anxious about their fann economy and threats to manufacturing from 
overseas competition. Among Republican voters in the Iowa primary, fann policy was third in issue 
salience (mentioned by one fifth of the voters), and the majority of those who thought that it was 
important (58 percent) preferred Dole to all the other candidates and over Bush, in particular, by a 
six to one margin. Farm policy was among the top three issues for the Iowa Democrats, and those 
for whom fann policy was salient preferred Gephardt to any other candidate by more than three to 
one. Foreign trade was also considered an important issue by nearly a fifth of the Democrats, and 
they too favored Gephardt over the others by at least two to one. 
However, voters in the east and south did not exhibit the same sectoral economic concerns 
that preoccupied voters in the midwest. Fann issues were barely discussed outside the midwest and 
foreign trade was mentioned by only 11 percent of the Democrats and by 1 4  percent and 8 percent of 
the Republicans in New Hampshire and the south respectively. In the latter case, Dole's advantage 
on these issues in Iowa went over to Bush by New Hampshire and Supeffuesday, and in Gephardt's 
case, Gore took the voters with trade concerns in the South. In other words, even when the foreign 
trade and fonn issues remained salient, the midwestern candidate did not always benefit 
Aside from the economic basis of regionalism, another reason it may have played so 
prominent a role in 1988 has to do with the incentives arising from conventional momentum theory. 
If it is true that early victories are the key and that the race is over before it gets to states like 
Indiana, Ohio and California, then it is natural for those with a home base in the early primary states 
to think that they might have a leg up on the opposition. Midwestern candidates had a name 
recognition advantage in Iowa that helped distinguish them from the large field of relatively 
unknown candidates. On the Democratic side, the candidates with the highest name recognition in 
Iowa were the two who had run for the nomination in 1984 (Hart 93% and Jackson 92%). Among 
5. D. Roderick Kiewiet and Doug Rivers, "The Economic Basis of Reagan's Appeal," in John E. Chubb and Paul E.
Peterson (eds.) The New Direction in American Politics; Washingtorc Brookings Institution, 1985. 
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the rest, th e  order was Gephardt (84%), Simon (82%), Dukakis (78%), Babbitt (70%) and Gore 
(64%). Bush (92%) and Pat Robertson (91 %), the TV evangelist, had the highest levels of name 
recognition among the Republican candidates. However, among the rest, Senator Dole from Kansas, 
was the leader (86%), followed by Haig (84%), Kemp (75%) and Dupont (65%). 
Since the perspectives in the different regions were not similar, voters in a sense learned less 
from the results of the Iowa caucuses than they had in the past. Not all strong showings at the polls 
were equal in the eyes of the press and the public, who tended instead to discount home turf victories 
and to play up victories that demonstrated broad appeal (hence, the fuss over Jackson's victories in 
Michigan and Vermont, and Dukakis's victories in Texas and Wisconsin). The failure of regional 
strategies in 1988 may discourage a recurrence of this phenomenon in 1 992. 
THE JACKSON CANDIDACY 
A critical factor in the slowing of momentum during the 1988 Democratic Primary was the 
strong showing by Jesse Jackson. In 1 984, entering late and without the united support of the Black 
community, Jackson won only two primaries and 1 8  percent of the vote. By contrast, at the end of 
the 1 988 campaign, Jackson had finished second to Dukakis, winning seven primaries (Alabama, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Virginia, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia) and 29 percent 
of the primary vote. Building on his Super Tuesday performance (where he won most of the votes 
overall), Jackson was the only credible obstacle to Dukakis' nomination up to the New York 
primary. 
In the period between March 8 and April 19, Jackson won the caucuses in Alaska (March 
10), South Carolina (March 12), and Michigan (March 26), and finished ahead of Dukakis in the 
Illinois primary (March 15), and got nearly one third of the vote in the predominantly white 
Connecticut (March 29) and Wisconsin (April 5) primaries. It was only after New York and 
Pennsylvania that Dukakis 's victory seemed assured. 
What was behind Jackson's i.111provement over 1 984? Two kinds of expianations are 
plausible. The first is institutional, centering on such factors as the consequences of the Fairness 
Commission and the creation of a Super Tuesday primary in the South. The Fairness Commission 
was created after the 1984 campaign in response to Jackson's contention that the rules unfairly 
penalized his candidacy and aided Walter Mondale's. Jackson called for an end to winner-take-all 
primaries, bonuses and caucuses on the grounds that they denied all contenders other than the 
front-runner their fair share of delegates. Pointing to the fact that he received only 12 percent of the 
delegates in return for his 18 percent of the vote in 1 984, Jackson argued that anything but 
proportional representation was unfair in two senses- unfair because it rewarded the front-runner 
with an artificial lead over the other contenders, and unfair because it affected "momentum" by 
altering people's perceptions of credibility based on delegate shares. 
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In the end, th e  Democratic party was reluctant to change its rules once again, and the 
Fairness Commission, headed by Donald Fowler of South Carolina (not Jackson's choice for the 
job), recommended only a few amendments to the procedures such as a lowering of the threshold 
needed to win delegates from 20 to 15 percent and a repeal of the rule that delegate selection events 
had to be closed to non-party members. Despite this, Jackson did well in 1988, achieving 
proportional shares of the delegates under the same rules he opposed in 1984. Only in the direct 
election primaries (i.e., loophole primaries) was he systematically penalized in his 1988 delegate 
share (e.g., Illinois, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Maryland). 
If the minor changes of the Fairness Commission seem unnlikely explanations for Jackson's 
success in 1988, the creation of Super Tuesday may have done more. Prior to 1988, there were two 
schools of thought about the potential impact that Super Tuesday might have on Jackson's 
campaign. The first maintained that because the Southern primaries in 1984 were held on different 
days and, for the most part, late in the spring, Jackson would be unable to capitalize on his southern 
strength. By bundling the Southern contests together and placing them earlier in the primary 
calendar, many thought that Jackson would get the kind of electoral boost from Super Tuesday that 
could make him a candidate to be reckoned with in 1988. 
The opposing theory, espoused by Charles Robb of Virginia, conceded that Jackson would 
do well in the south, but predicted that Jackson would not be advantaged by the Super Tuesday 
format. Jackson, he maintained, had benefited in 1984 from the low 1984 turnout in the South and, 
he reasoned, heightened interest in the campaign and higher turnout caused by the new format would 
drop Jackson's vote in 1988.6 With the benefit of hindsight, we can say that Super Tuesday did in 
fact help Jackson, but the Robb hypothesis was not completely wrong: Jackson's share of the 1988 
vote dropped in four Southern states from what it had been in 1984 (Louisiana, due to the peculiar 
circumstances of its 1984 primary, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Arkansas--all states critical to Gore's 
brief, but significant, elevation to the top rung of candidates). Robb's prediction, as a whole, was 
undone by Jackson's substantial gains in states like Mississippi, Virginia, Georgia and Alabama. 
Institutional factors-t.tie cha..11ge in t..lie threshold requirement cr..a1ige, peihaps, and the 
Super Tuesday format to a greater extent-may have boosted Jackson's candidacy to a degree, but 
even before Super Tuesday, Jackson had exceeded his 1984 performance in the largely all-white 
states of Iowa, New Hampshire and, especially, Vermont (going from 8 percent to 26 percent). In 
other words, there were signs even before Super Tuesday of an important behavioral change: 
namely, that Jackson was doing better than before at attracting highly liberal, well-educated white 
voters in addition to his loyal core of black voters. This was not exactly the Rainbow coalition that 
Jackson had envisioned in 1984. Rather it was as much a black and white marble cake with parts 
that coalesced but did not mix. To affluent white liberals, Jackson was the only true standard bearer 
of the left, especially after Simon's candidacy faltered. To black voters, Jackson was one of their 
6. See "The '88 Calendar May Give Jackson a Boost," Congressional Quarterly, May 9, 1987, p. 2387 and "Will 'Super 
Tuesday' Rules Mean Southern Trouble?;" Congressional Quarterly, May 9, 1987, p. 879. 
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own who understood and spoke eloquently about the black community's struggle with drugs, crime 
and poverty. 
The upscale profile of Jackson's white supporters was widely noted by the press. A perusal 
of the logit estimates in the appendix shows that the odds of voting for Jackson versus Dukakis were 
positively and significantly enhanced by being college educated in nearly all of the states the Times 
polled in. A corollary to this is that Jackson ran well in areas with large numbers of college students. 
Jackson also tended to do better among white-<:ollar than blue-<:ollar whites. For instance, the 
estimates in the appendix show Gephardt in Iowa and Gore in the south did better than Jackson with 
blue- collar whites. Even after Gephardt and Gore dropped out, Jackson was unable to gain any 
particular advantage over Dukakis among blue-<:ollar white voters (see the Pennsylvania and 
California equations). Needless to say, our data indicate clearly that the core of Jackson's support 
was black. Jackson received over 90 percent of the black vote in every state polled by the LA 
Times, and the coefficients in the Jackson equation reflect this dramatically. 
Why did Jackson get the upscale white-<:ollar white rather than the blue-<:ollar white 
Democratic vote? The answer lies in the left wing appeal of the Jackson campaign. In Table 2, 
which shows the distribution of Democratic vote by self-identified ideological placement, we saw 
earlier that Jackson was the first choice of the very liberal voters in every state polled except New 
Hampshire and Pennsylvania. Moreover, the coefficients on the ideology variables in the various 
equations in the appendix indicate that, controlling for demographic factors, the odds of voting for 
Jackson increased as one went from being a conservative to a moderate to a liberal. Jackson 
attracted left-wing votes and the white left in the Democratic party tends to be college-educated, 
white-<:ollar-not working class. 
Another piece of evidence on this point can be found in Table 3, which displays at the 
bottom the proportion of white white-<:ollar Democrats, white blue-<:ollar Democrats, Hispanic 
Democrats, Black Democrats and Republicans who favored various issue positions. On almost 
every item in all three regions for which we have comparable questions, white-<:ollar white 
Democrats, \vere more likely t.11.an blue--collai wt.rite Der11ocrats to favor aid for abortions, oppose 
mandatory AIDS testing, endorse additional domestic spending and support defense cuts. Indeed, on 
a number of issues, upper- class white voters were more liberal than Hispanic and black 
Democrats---for instance, on banning abortions (compared to Hispanics), defense cuts, support for 
the INF, and favoring a tax hike. 
It is not surprising therefore that well-educated upper class white Democrats were attracted 
to Jackson's candidacy. When asked to name the qualities that led them to vote the way they did on 
Super Tuesday, the leading answer for Jackson whites was Jackson's "vision" or "convictions" (67 
percent). By comparison, blacks were most likely to mention empathy ( 49 percent}--that he 
"understood their problems." Asked to name the issues that were most important to their decisions, 
white Jackson supporters were more likely than black Jackson supporters to mention defense and 
morality in government while Jackson blacks were more likely to say social security. The vast 
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majority of Jackson whites (72 percent) and Jackson blacks (89 percent) thought that the government 
was responsible for providing jobs and a decent standard of living, but only 33 percent of the 
Jackson whites thought that the government should support traditional values as compared with 57 
percent of Jackson blacks. As a corollary, 46 percent of Jackson whites thought that religion had too 
much influence over politics as compared to 1 1  percent of Jackson blacks. White and black Jackson 
supporters were united by economic liberalism, but separated by social conservatism and their 
relative levels of interest in foreign policy (e.g., Jackson whites were almost twice as likely to favor 
defense cuts and four times more likely to support the INF treaty). The Jackson campaign was, as 
we said before, as much and perhaps more a marble cake coalition of ideological middle class whites 
with predominantly non-middle class blacks as it was a Rainbow coalition of economically 
disadvantaged groups. 
Still the Rainbow aspect of Jackson's candidacy cannot be totally dismissed since, for 
instance, Jackson won a slightly higher share of the Hispanic vote than he did the white. According 
to the Times data, he took about 29 percent of the Mexican-American vote in the South and 23 
percent in Illinois. He did even better with the predominantly Puerto Rican Hispanics in New York, 
getting almost 64 percent of the vote there. The coefficients in the relevant equations also show that, 
controlling for all other factors, Hispanics were more inclined than whites toward Jackson, but a 
moderate Catholic Hispanic in New York was still more likely to support Dukakis than Jackson. 
Nonetheless, given the low socio-economic status of the Hispanic community in the U.S. and the 
success of Hispanic-Black coalitions in Chicago, Boston and Los Angeles, Jackson could have 
expected to have done better. But once again, as in 1984, the majority of Hispanics did not embrace 
his candidacy. Such idiosyncratic factors as Dukakis's ability to speak Spanish cannot be discounted 
as an explanation for his support among Hispanics (although fewer than five percent of Hispanics in 
California regarded Dukakis as an ethnic candidate). However, religion may have been another 
cause. From the first primaries in Iowa and New Hampshire, Dukakis ran very well with Catholics, 
especially as compared to Jackson. He got the larges share of the Catholic vote in every state the LA 
Times polled except Illinois, and in every state the logit estimates indicate Catholicism as leading to 
greater support for Dukakis. Since most Hispanics are Catholic, one reason that Hispanics did not 
rally to t..he Jackson cause may have been a religious un.ease about voting for a Protestant minister. 
(One notices a similar, though less pronounced, reluctance of Catholics to support Pat Robertson in 
the Republican primaries.) 
Ideology and issues may also have played a role in generating Hispanic support for Dukakis 
since Hispanics are less likely than either white or black Democrats to call themselves liberals and, 
as we have found, ideology played a major role in electoral choice during the 1988 primaries. 
Hispanics, were also less attuned to the environmental and foreign policy themes that attracted many 
left wing, affluent whites to Jackson. 
In the end, the boost from Super Tuesday and the successes in March gave way to decisive 
defeats for Jackson in Wisconsin, New York and Pennsylvania. The New York primary especially 
finished Jackson's chances in a bitter and racially divided contest. If regionalism slowed Dukakis's 
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progress toward the nomination, racial tension and strategic behavior on the part of Jews, moderates 
and conservatives in New York and Pennsylvania accelerated it. Voters in all these groups 
apparently concluded on the basis of Gore's inability to defeat Dukakis in Florida and Texas and to 
register any significant victories outside the south that Dukakis was the only acceptable candidate 
with a chance to win. Faced with the prospect of a good showing by their least preferred alternative, 
they acted in a self-consciously and openly strategic way, abandoning Gore for the next most 
desirable candidate- Dukakis. 
There are several pieces of evidence on this point in the LA Times data. In both the New 
York and Pennsylvania primaries, voters were asked in the exit poll to explain their choices. In New 
York, 14 percent said that they were voting primarily against another candidate and 11 percent 
indicated that they were casting their ballots in a manner that did not waste their votes. 
Seventy-seven percent of the former and 64 percent of the latter voted for Dukakis over Jackson and 
Gore. By comparison, Dukakis only received 36 percent of the vote from those who said they were 
willing to "express their feelings" and 42 percent from those who were voting for "the best man for 
the job." Also in New York, 54 percent of those sampled agreed with the statement that casting a 
ballot for Gore was a wasted vote. Of these, not too suiprisingly, Dukakis won 62 percent of the 
votes and Gore only 5 percent. Gore received his strongest support among conservatives, but 
moderates voted overwhelmingly for Dukakis. 
The same pattern was repeated in Pennsylvania. Overall, 12 percent of those voting said that 
their main motivation was to vote against the other (of whom 83 percent voted for Dukakis) and 
another 12 percent said that they were motivated by not wanting to waste their votes (of whom 76 
percent voted for Dukakis). As in New York, a little over half (51 percent) thought that voting for 
Gore was equivalent to throwing away their vote and, of these, three quarters voted for Dukakis. 
Again, by comparison, Dukakis got 62 percent of the vote from those who voted to express their 
feelings and 64 percent of those who thought that their candidate was the best man for the job. Even 
in California, long after the race was decided, 10 percent of the voters indicated that they were 
motivated by an interest in not wasting their votes. 
The two major categories of voters whose support swung to Dukakis in New York and 
Pennsylvania were non-liberals and Jews. In Iowa and New Hampshire, Dukakis had drawn fairly 
evenly from the "somewhat conservative", "somewhat liberal" and "moderate" voters, but his share 
of them almost doubled in New York and Pennsylvania, as is evident in Table 2a. In Pennsylvania, 
with Gore virtually eliminated by the results in New York, Dukakis received 75 percent of the 
moderate vote and 73 percent of the somewhat conservative vote. In contrast, Jackson's share of the 
very liberal vote does not shift very much after Super Tuesday. 
The other critical group in these primaries was the Jews. A highly liberal group--in New 
York, for example, 22 percent of Jewish voters called themselves "very liberal" and 39 percent 
"somewhat liberal" - under most circumstances they would have been attracted to a liberal 
candidate. In Jackson's case, however, there was simply too much history of distrust, misstatement 
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and controversy. Making matters worse (although its impact on the election is unclear), Mayor Koch 
waded into the primary by endorsing Gore and advising Jews and other supporters oflsrael that they 
would be "crazy" to vote for Jackson. Jackson himself obseived that, "In New York, there has been 
more divisive language than in any other state or region. "7 
Evidence of Jewish-black tensions in New York is abundant and stark. Thirty nine percent 
of all Democratic voters and 79 percent of Jews thought that Jesse Jackson was anti-Semitic. 
Eighty-eight percent of Jews said that their sympathies in the Middle East Jay with Israel as 
compared to 37 percent of the voters overall, 12 percent of the blacks and 25 percent of the 
Hispanics. Jackson received 71 percent of the vote of those who said their sympathies were with the 
Arabs, and 49 percent of those who said neither the Israelis or the Arabs. Many of the strategic 
considerations discussed earlier were even more evident in Jewish responses to these items. 
Compared to 44 percent of Democratic voters who thought that Jackson was unelectable in 
November, 74 percent of the Jewish voters thought so. Sixty-nine percent of Jews thought that a 
vote for Gore was wasted, and 46 percent said that Jackson should not be the Democratic party's 
nominee even if he won the most number of delegates in the primaries. Blacks felt equally 
embattled. Eighty-eight percent of Jackson voters felt there was an element of racism in voting 
against Jackson, a charge which many Jews resented. 
Since many of these tensions had existed since at least 1984 and Jackson was already known 
to Jews, it is unlikely that Jackson ever had any chance of getting a large number of Jewish votes. In 
Florida and Illinois, Jews had voted for Dukakis and Simon overwhelmingly, and Jackson had 
received less than 1 0  percent of the Jewish vote-which is also what happened in New York and 
Pennsylvania. The main loser in the New York campaigu was Gore who, but for the fear of Jackson, 
might have parlayed his pro-Israel voting record and moderate politics into a respectable challenge 
to Dukakis. 
CONCLUSION: THE MYTH OF MOMENTUM? 
WPit.lier momentu .... T..? The conventional wisdom about presidential primaries is that victories 
in the early caucuses and primaries give a candidate a burst of media attention which, in tum, 
generates campaign contributions and additional exposure. A bandwagon is begun which can propel 
a previously unknown candidate-such as George McGovern or Jimmy Carter-to the nomination. 
Nineteen eighty-eight hardly fits this pattern. Robert Dole and Richard Gephardt won the Iowa 
caucuses handily, but it was the first, last, and only hurrah for their campaigns. Michael Dukakis, 
not too surprisingly, won neighboring New Hampshire, only to be beaten by Albert Gore (who sat 
out Iowa and New Hampshire) or Jesse Jackson in every southern state except Florida and Texas. 
One might attribute Dukakis's victories in those two states to momentum, but then how can one 
explain Jackson, Dukak:is, and Gore all losing to Paul Simon in Illinois? 
7. "The Airis Bitter to Buoyant as Voting Nears," Bernard Weintraub, New York Times, April 19, 1988.
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We think an alternative explanation better accounts for the course of the 1988 primary 
campaign than conventional momentum theories and, possibly, for primaries in other years as well. 
The explanation centers on strategic voting. In two-candidate races, voters face a relatively simple 
decision: is one candidate preferable to the other? In multi-candidate races (as are most presidential 
primaries), the decision problem is considerably more complicated. Consider, for example, the 
situation in the 1988 New York Democratic primary. The field had, for all practical purposes, been 
reduced to Dukakis, Jackson, and Gore. However, most polls showed Jackson running close to 
Dukakis with Gore far behind. A Jackson victory appeared to be a real possibility. Many 
conservative and Jewish voters preferred Gore to Dukakis to Jackson. Their dilemma was obvious: 
voting for their most preferred candidate (Gore) might lead to the unthinkable, a Jackson victory. By 
and large, conservative voters abandoned Gore and swelled Dukakis's margin of victory. 
The strategic considerations described above are not unique to the New York primary and, in 
our view, are pervasive in multi-candidate primaries. In general, it is an equilibrium strategy in a 
three candidate race for a voter to support the candidate he or she prefers among the two candidates 
who are most preferred by the remaining voters. That is, one counts the number of other voters who 
most prefer a particular candidate and eliminate from consideration the candidate preferred by the 
least number of voters. In New York, this was clearly Gore. 
How can such strategic considerations account for the course of the 1988 presidential 
primary campaign? In our view, the effect of earlier primaries is not to create a bandwagon, but to 
help voters gauge the preferences of other voters. If two states are similar and one holds their 
primary before the other, voters in the second primary can interpret the outcome of the first primary 
as a sort of " straw poll" of voters in their own state to determine which candidates are likely to be in 
contention for a first place finish. This explains how the results of small, seemingly unimportant 
state primaries and caucuses at the beginning of the primary season can appear to have so much 
influence. A victory in Iowa or New Hampshire serves to identify which candidates will be viable in 
subsequent states. 
If tliis logic is correct, why did Dole and Gephardt fail io gain any advantage from their 
victories in the Iowa caucuses? The answer is two-fold. First, the results in an earlier primary are 
informative only insofar as the states are similar. Iowa and New Hampshire are similar in many 
ways, but are in very different regions. The regional advantage of Dole and Gephardt made their 
victories in Iowa and New Hampshire less meaningful than, say, Jimmy Carter's strong showing 
there in 1976. Second, a victory in an earlier primary has strategic consequences only if that victory 
alters voters' perceptions of who the leading candidates are. Bush's finish in Iowa was indeed very 
poor and smprising, but it did not alter New Hampshire voters' perceptions that the Republican 
primaries were largely a Bush-Dole contest. If, on the other hand, New Hampshire voters had taken 
Pat Robertson's candidacy more seriously, they might have faced a Dole-Robertson choice rather 
than a Dole-Bush choice. In this case, Bush support in New Hampshire might have eroded greatly. 
But it was Dole's misfortune that a rather weak candidate like Robertson (instead of perhaps Kemp) 
was the most successful candidate on Bush's right. 
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The pattern throughout 1988 was for a candidate near the median (Bush and Dukakis) to face 
challenges on the left and right from more than one candidate on each side. In the Democratic 
primaries, Dukakis early on established himself as the most viable candidate of the middle. Jackson 
and Simon battled for supremacy on the left while Gore and Gephardt jockeyed on the right. 
Jackson, with a rock-solid constituency base in the black community, outlasted Simon, while Gore's 
strong showing on Super Tuesday ended Gephardt's chances. By the time the race had been 
winnowed to three candidates, however, Dukakis had a commanding delegate lead and was the clear 
frontrunner for the nomination. The strategic considerations outlined above then greatly benefitted 
Dukakis by squeezing out one of his remaining two opponents. On the Republican side, the same 
factors benefitted Bush. Dole was the clear alternative on the left, but Kemp and Robertson split the 
right. This made the race primarily a Bush-Dole affair that, by virtue of his position at the 
Republican median, Bush was guaranteed to win. 
Table 1 
Ideology of Voters in Caucuses and Primaries 
Very Somewhat Middle-of- Somewhat Very Don't think of N 
liberal liberal the-road conservative conservative self that way 
Iowa 
Democratic 1 0  31 32 19 2 6 1450 
Republican 2 8 18  44 23 4 1470 
New Hampshire 
Democratic 1 4  35 26 13 4 8 1699 
Republican 2 8 19 42 22 6 1995 
South* 
Democratic 1 0  23 27 21 8 1 1  4516 
Republican 4 1 0  18  37 24 7 3132 
Illinois 
Democratic 13 29 28 14 5 1 1  2002 
Republican 4 13  28 33 15 7 1088 
New York 
Democratic 18 30 25 10 4 1 2  2952 
Pennsylvania 
Democratic 1 2  24 32 15 5 1 1  3432 
California 
Democratic 15 31 26 1 4  3 1 1  2243 
* Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, and Texas 
Table 2a 
Ideology and Voting in Democratic Primaries 
Very Somewhat Middle-of- Somewhat Very 
liberal liberal the-road conservative conservative 
Iowa 
Dukakis 15 28 24 22 1 7  
Jackson 27 12 8 8 21 
Simon 21 27 24 18  7 
Gephardt 15 18 29 33 41 
Other 22 15 1 6  1 9  14 
Total 100 100 101 100 100 
N (141) (444) (467) (276) (29) 
New Hampshire 
Dukakis 36 35 34 32 10 
Jackson 22 13  5 4 4 
Gore 3 5 15 1 0  2 
Simon 1 6  27 1 6  18  2 
Gephardt 5 9 19 26 41 
Other 20 1 1  1 2  1 1  41 
Total 102 100 101 101 100 
N (233) (595) (449) (220) (68) 
South 
Dukakis 24 35 30 22 1 6  
Jackson 44 29 20 1 4  29 
Gore 19 23 32 45 35 
Gephardt 5 8 10 10 9 
Other 8 6 8 9 10 
Total 100 101 100 100 99 
N (463) (1020) (1235) (960) (347) 
Illinois 
Dukak:is 13 18  24 18  1 7  
T�.,,,17,..,... .,. 56 30 20 23 46 JCll,,..1\...:'!IUll 
Gore 2 4 4 1 0  5 
Simon 26 45 49 42 28 
Other 2 3 3 7 5 
Total 99 100 100 100 101 
N (253) (574) (559) (290) (102) 
New York 
Dukak:is 36 56 56 56 30 
Jackson 57 33 29 27 59 
Gore 5 9 12 1 6  10 
Other 2 2 3 1 1 i 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
N (536) (887) (734) (308) (123) 
Very Somewhat Middle-of- Somewhat Very 
liberal liberal the-road conservative conservative 
Pennsylvania 
Dukakis 55 64 76 74 7 1  
Jackson 42 32 19 19 24 
Other 3 4 5 8 5 
Total 100 100 100 101 100 
N (419) (834) (1088) (530) (187) 
California 
Dukakis 28 50 64 60 39 
Jackson 69 46 32 32 55 
Other 3 5 4 9 5 
Total 100 101 100 101 99 
N (341) (688) (580) (326) (69) 
Table 2b 
Ideology and Voting in Republican Primaries 
Very Somewhat Middle-of- Somewhat Very 
liberal liberal the-road conservative conservative 
Iowa 
Bush 21 22 20 1 9  1 1  
Dole 50 54 47 37 1 6  
Robertson 1 5  14 15 21 46 
Kemp 9 6 6 12 18  
Other 6 4 12 1 0  8 
Total 101 100 100 99 99 
N (34) (115) (272) (645) (344) 
New Hampshire 
Bush 26 38 41 40 28 
Dole 50 43 34 27 1 4  
Robertson 1 6  3 7 8 20 
Kemp 6 6 10  11  25 
Other 2 9 8 1 4  12 
Total 100 99 100 100 99 
N (50) (162) (383) (836) (447) 
South 
Bush 57 54 56 54 46 
Dole 26 33 29 26 15 
Robertson 10 7 9 1 4  29 
Kemp 5 3 4 5 9 
Other 2 4 2 1 1 
Total 100 101 100 100 100 
N (129) (300) (573) (1154) (767) 
Illinois 
Bush 54 52 42 52 48 
Dole 24 38 49 A 1  "" � '  '"" 
Robertson 13 5 6 6 19 
Kemp 9 1 I 1 2 
Other 0 3 2 0 2 
Total 100 99 100 100 100 
N (46) (139) (307) (360) (160) 
Table 3 
IMPACT OF ISSUES ON CHOICE 
Illinois 
More 
Abortion AIDS Contra Defense Domestic INF Restrict Oil Tax 
Ban Testing Aid Cuts Spending Treaty Imports Tax Hike 
Dukakis 1 4  34 13 43 38 33 34 1 6  17 
Jackson 1 6  33 7 41 36 18  20 11 12 
Simon 1 7  32 12 41 39 28 30 15 41 
Gore 24 38 24 21 31 35 29 14 15 
Bush 24 40 30 22 23 29 32 14 12 
Dole 21 36 23 33 25 29 32 1 6  16  
Robertson 72 54 39 19 21 13  38 14 11  
WW Dems 1 4  30 13 57 50 41 30 15 27 
WB Dems 21 41 11 37 38 25 39 19 14 
Hisp Dems 22 43 11 40 48 18  20 15 12 
Bl Dems 18 39 7 42 36 14 20 11 11 
Republicans 28 43 32 26 23 30 34 1 7  1 4  
New Hampshire 
More 
Aid For AIDS Contra Day- Defense Domestic Budget 
Abortions Testing Aid Care Cuts Spending Freeze 
Dukakis 33 20 6 50 54 40 37 
Jackson 47 12 4 69 78 56 31 
Gore 22 22 21 43 53 36 47 
Simon 44 1 4  � 57 70 40 32 � 
Gephardt 1 3  30 15 28 37 25 41 
Bush 1 9  33 47 25 21 1 9  51 
Dole 21 22 28 31 38 19 61 
Kemp 1 4  30 49 21 15 15 50 
Robertson 3 44 51 20 21 15 47 
WW Dem 43 19 9 57 65 47 39 
WB Dem 23 25 8 45 49 38 38 
Republicans 1 7  32 42 24 25 18 56 
South 
More 
Abortion AIDS Contra Defense Domestic 
Ban Testing Aid Cuts Spending 
Dukakis 1 8  3 1  1 4  37 32 
Gephardt 22 40 18 28 22 
Gore 24 42 19  25 23 
Jackson 1 6  3 1  7 36 33 
Simon 1 4  33 13 45 35 
Bush 29 46 42 1 4  1 4  
Dole 25 37 3 1  23 19 
Kemp 47 53 53 13 1 7  
Robertson 74 58 45 14 13 
WW Dems 1 8  35 1 4  44 36 
WB Dems 25 40 1 4  30 27 
Hisp Dems 29 36 16 29 34 
Bl Dems 20 38 7 33 33 
Republicans 37 48 42 17 1 6  
Note: Entries are %  of candidate's voters who support each measure 
INF Restrict Oil Tax 
Treaty Imports Tax Hike 
3 1  33 18 23 
24 42 19  20 
23 37 18 16 
1 7  22 1 1 15 
39 40 19 24 
28 33 1 7  1 3  
30 36 19 21 
22 33 19 1 1
1 4  37 1 8  8 
35 35 21 29 
2 1  40 15 16 
1 7  29 15 1 4  
12  23 10 13 
27 36 18 15 
Table 4 
Percentage of Voters Mentioning Candidates' Region 
Iowa New Hampshire South Illinois 
Democratic 
Dukakis 1 30 1 2 
Jackson 1 0 5 4 
Gore 0 1 18 1 
Simon 23 0 1 16 
Gephardt 46 1 4 15 
Republican 
Bush 2 1 1 1 
Dole 38 2 2 11  
Robertson 0 0 1 3 
Kemp 2 0 2 0 
Appendix 1 
IOWA 
Dole Robertson Kemp 
Constant .901 -1.621 -.035 
(.217) (.218) (.277) 
Liberal .301 -1.219 -1.283 
(.237) (.314) (.418) 
Moderate .213 -.933 -.921 
(.191) (.234) (.297) 
White Collar -.206 -.835 -.405 
(.190) (.197) (.242) 
College -.070 -.745 .038 
(.180) (.188) (.237) 
Union -.244 .083 -.214 
(.196) (.209) (.262) 
Catholic .043 -.379 .193 
(.196) (.228) (.249) 
Female .067 .314 .387 
(.160) (.174) (.207) 
Log Likelihood -1621 
n 1316 
Note: Base category for Democratic equations is vote for Dukakis. Only candidates with 
significant fractions of the vote are included. 
Base category for Republican equations is vote for Bush. No equations estimated after 
Supel'Tuesday, since the Los Angeles Times stopped polling Republicans at that point. 
IOWA - II
Jackson Simon Gephardt 
Constant -1.123 -.339 1.129 
(.350) (.279) (.251) 
Liberal .122 .188 -.584 
(.263) (.225) (.221) 
Moderate -.603 .118 -.156 
(.304) (.235) (.218) 
White Collar .516 .151 -.599 
(.247) (.190) (.186) 
College .368 .424 -.451 
(.244) (.192) (.185) 
Female -.370 -.479 -.526 
(.211) (.169) (.1 72) 
Union .308 .323 .024 
(.224) (.180) (.186) 
Catholic -1.004 -.337 -.373 
(.271) (.183) (.189) 
Fundamental .881 -.011 -.067 
(.233) (.209) (.207) 
Farmer -.170 .601 .538 
(.357) (.249) (.242) 
Log Likelihood -1289 
n 1025 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Jackson Simon Gephardt 
Constant -1.483 -1.000 ---0.101 
(0.321) (0.251)  (0.226) 
Liberal 0.690 0.304 -1.188 
(0.268) (0.206) (0.211) 
Moderate ---0.331 0.008 ---0.345 
(0.339) (0.231) (0.207) 
White Collar ---0.372 0.224 ---0.363 
(0.214) (0.181) (0.186) 
College 0.568 0.426 0.008 
(0.256) (0.198) (0.196) 
Female ---0.003 ---0.345 ---0.316 
(0.188) (0.149) (0. 167) 
Catholic ---0.543 ---0. 1 10 0.003 
(0. 191) (0.150) (0.169) 
Union 0.104 0.007 0.531 
(0.209) (0.167) (0.175) 
Log Likelihood -1457 
n 1186 
SOUTH - SUPERTUESDAY 
Jackson Gore 
Constant -1.501 1 .052 
(.180) (. 1 10) 
Liberal .449 -.822 
(.154) (. l l  l) 
Moderate -. 1 1 8  -.464 
(. 171)  (. 108) 
White Collar -.1 12 -.035 
(.143) (.100) 
College .56 1  -.287 
(.158) (. 103) 
Union .021 .279 
(.143) ( .101) 
Catholic -.427 -1 .201 
(.169) ( .132) 
Jew -1.36 1  -2.203 
(.358) (.327) 
Female -.354 -.219 
(.127) (.089) 
Black 2.432 -.496 
(. l 1 7) (. 1 69) 
Hispanic .797 -i.37i 
(.288) (.364) 




Constant -1 .137 --0.972 
(0.204) (0.238) 
Liberal 0.190 --0.766 
(0.146) (0.175) 
Moderate --0.635 --0.313 
(0.174) (0.177) 
White Collar 0.005 0.005 
(0.134) (0.165) 
College 0.574 0.008 
(0.147) (0. 170) 
Union 0.004 --0.250 
(0.117) (0.145) 
Catholic --0.445 --0.169 
(0. 131) (0.178) 
Female --0.009 --0.007 
(0.116) (0.139) 
Black 4.409 --0.003 
(0.244) (0.513) 
Hispanic 1.732 --0.789 
(0.178) (0.408) 
Jew -1.568 -0.200 
(0. i81) (0.192) 




All Voters Whites Only 
Constant -1.913 -2. 157 
(0.170) (0.187) 
Liberal 0.710 0.805 
(0.147) (0.161) 
Moderate 0.169 0.248 
(0.159) (0.1 74) 
White Collar 0.126 0.205 
(0.131) (0.140) 
College 0.581 0.668 
(0.132) (0.141) 
Union --0.219 --0.195 
(0.121) (0.130) 
Catholic --0.430 --0.314 
(0.120) (0.126) 
Female --0.259 --0.234 





Jews -1.652 -1.760 
(0.319) (0.344) 
Log Likelihood -1005.4 -862.6 




























































Dole Robertson Kemp 
Constant .901 - 1 .621 -.035 
(.217) (.2 1 8) (.277) 
Liberal .301 - 1 .219 - 1 .283 
(.237) (.3 14) (.418) 
Moderate .2 13 -.933 -.921 
(.191) (.234) (.297) 
White Collar -.206 -.835 -.405 
(.190) (. 197) (.242) 
College -.070 -.745 .038 
(. 1 80) (.188) (.237) 
Union -.244 .083 -.214 
(. 196) (.209) (.262) 
Catholic .043 -.379 . 193 
(.196) (.228) (.249) 
Female .067 .314 .387 
(.160) (. 174) (.207) 
Log Likelihood -1621 
n 1316 
IOWA II 
Dole Robertson Kemp 
Constant .517 -.574 -.936 
(.248) (.310) (.338) 
Liberal .331 -.997 -1.086 
(.248) (.357) (.449) 
Moderate .258 -.599 -.757 
(.201) (.271) (.320) 
White Collar -. 1 1 1  -.743 -.318 
(.204) (.229) (.265) 
College .050 -.743 . 124 
( .187) (.216) (.254) 
Female .098 . 130 .342 
(. 169) (. 199) (.222) 
Union -.304 -.001 -.278 
(.207) (.24 1) (.281) 
Catholic .223 .695 .739 
(.213) (.279) (.279) 
Fundamental .346 3.193 1.390 
(.1 82) (.249) (.238) 
Farmer .561 -.199 .207 
(.231) (.282) (.3 1 3) 
Log Likelihood -1358 
n 1236 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
Dole Robertson Kemp 
Constant -0.522 -0.532 -0.680 
(0. 162) (0. 198) (0.193) 
Liberal 0.627 -0.954 -1 . 1 1 1  
(0. 177) (0.34 1) (0.327) 
Moderate 0.205 -1.028 -0.755 
(0. 144) (0.254) (0.214) 
White Collar -0.002 -0.547 -0.276 
(0. 141) (0.1 84) (0.175) 
College 0.189 --0.365 0.006 
(0.142) (0.1 85) (0. 178) 
Female -0.001 0.396 -0.142 
(0. 1 19) (0. 1 67) (0. 154) 
Catholic 0.010 -0.195 0.291 
(0.125) (0. 179) (0. 155) 
Union 0.25 1 0.002 0.429 
(0. 157) (0.232) (0. 196) 
Log Likelihood -2007 
n 1631 
SOUTH - SUPER TUESDAY 
Dole Robertson 
Constant -1 .147 -.807 
(. 1 19) (.128) 
Liberal .280 -.970 
(. 130) (.206) 
Moderate .204 -.769 
(. 1 1 7) (. 1 67) 
White Collar .237 -.027 
(.106) (. 122) 
College .172 -.057 
(.108) (.124) 
Union .029 -.322 
(. 1 13) (. 147) 
Catholic -.262 -.463 
(.134) (.173) 
Female .193 .068 
(.093) (.1 10) 
Log Likelihood -2524 
n 2616 
Appendix 2 
COMBINED ESTIMATIONS (All States) 
One Jackson -1.80 (.07) 
One Gore -.02 (.07) 
One Simon -.26 (.11) 
One Gephardt -.11 (.11) 
Region .60 (.03) 
Black Jackson 4.03 (.10) 
Black Gore .19 (.19) 
Black Simon -.82 (.28) 
Black Gephardt 1.69 (.23) 
Hispanic Jackson 1.30 (.11) 
Hispanic Gore -1.64 (.25) 
Hispanic Simon .94 (.32) 
Hispanic Gephardt -1.23 (.43) 
Liberal Jackson .46 (.07) 
Liberal Gore -1.01 (.08) 
Liberal Simon .22 (.11) 
Liberal Gephardt -.98 (.13) 
Moderate Jackson -.24 (.08) 
Moderate Gore -.52 (.08) 
Moderate Simon .06 (.12) 
Moderate Gephardt -.32 (.13) 
WC Jackson .17 (.06) 
WC Gore -.26 (.07) 
WC Simon .14 (.09) 
WC Gephardt -.32 (.11) 
Union Jackson .01 (.06) 
Union Gore -.05 (.07) 
Union Simon .16 (.09) 
Union Gephardt .36 (.11) 
Log LLlcelihood -9484 
n 12365 
